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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE INJUSTICE OF THE MARITAL RAPE
EXEMPTION: A SURVEY OF COMMON LAW
COUNTRIES
Sonya A. Adamo*
INTRODUCTION
A woman is raped by her husband the day after undergoing gyneco-
logical surgery, which causes her to hemorrhage and return to the hos-
pital.' Another woman is forced to have sex at knifepoint by her es-
tranged husband. Conscience and justice dictate that the perpetrators
of such crimes must suffer some punishment. Many common law coun-
tries, however, still sustain the misbelief that a husband is incapable of
raping his wife, due to the presumption of a wife's absolute, irrevocable
consent to any sexual acts during the course of marriage.3 These laws
provide a husband with immunity from prosecution for marital rape
simply because of his status as husband.4 Yet, this prospect is unsound.
Rape violates a woman's bodily integrity, freedom, and self-determina-
tion; the harm is not mitigated because the rape occurred in her mar-
J.D. Candidate, May 1990, Washington College of Law, The American
University.
1. See D. FINKELHOR & K. YLLO, LICENSE TO RAPE: SEXUAL ABUSE OF WIVES 18
(1985) (documenting brutal marital rapes from interviews, including a husband jump-
ing his wife in the dark and anally raping her over a woodpile, and a husband and his
friend gang-raping his wife after luring her to a vacant apartment).
2. Id.
3. See M. HALE, 1 THE HIstoRY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROwN 629 (S. Emlyn ed.
1778) (proclaiming that through mutual matrimonial consent and contract a wife has
given her nonretractable consent to her husband's sexual demands).
4. See Mitra, " . . For She Has no Right of Power to Refuse Her Consent." 1979
CRIM. L. REV. 558, 558 (stating that in England, a husband may evade prosecution for
raping his wife, adding that this raises fundamental questions about the law concerning
rape and marriage as an institution).
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riage bed.' Marital rape can be more traumatic and abusive than stran-
ger rape.6 Suffering at the hands of a spouse, who is usually a source of
trust and care, produces feelings of betrayal, disillusionment, and isola-
tion in the woman.
The spousal exemption to rape statutes is a grave injustice and adds
to the trauma of marital rape. A wife is not able to quickly and unilat-
erally secure protection; she must wait for the divorce process to take
its course to obtain relief, during which time she remains endangered.8
The rape law exemption, therefore, removes a wife's right to abstain
from sex and subjects her directly to the dangers of sexual violence.9
Approximately fourteen percent 0 of married women are victims of
marital rape. The law, in essence, refuses to acknowledge these women.
The rationale is that if a husband is unable to legally rape his wife
(within the definition of a law that includes a spousal exemption), mar-
ital rape cannot exist. Such a policy is contrary to modern attitudes
5. See S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL 428 (1975) (adding that the ideal
of bodily self-determination for all women should be an unqualified principle if it is to
become an invincible rule).
6. See D. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE 198 (1982) (stating that marital rape is
not less'life-threatening or frightening than stranger rape); see also D. FINKELHOR &
K. YLLO, supra note 1, at 118 (quoting a marital rape victim who stated, " 'when a
stranger does it [rape], he doesn't know me, I don't know him. He's not doing it to me
as a person, personally. With your husband, it becomes personal. You say, this man
knows me. He knows my feelings. He knows me intimately, and then to do this to
me-it's such a personal abuse . . . .") Another woman described her rape as at-
tempted murder, after her husband forced her to have sex without birth control when
she told him that her doctor informed her pregnancy may be fatal to her. Id.
7. Id. Friends, relatives, and professionals such as police and social workers treat
wife rape victims more poorly than stranger rape victims. Id. In addition, the wife
usually blames herself for the assault. Id.; see also D. FINKELHOR & K. YLLO, supra
note 1, at 126 (naming the destruction of the ability to trust as the most common long-
term effect).
8. D. FINKELHOR & K. YLLO, supra note 1, at 141. The authors fi d that the wife
is most at risk during the separation period because the husband senses anger and
resentment. Id. During a separation period, a husband is likely to retaliate physically
against his wife, who has no protection from the rape law until the divorce is final. Id.
9. See id. (suggesting that the permissive nature of rape law toward marital rape
may actually lead enraged husbands to rape their wives).
10. D. RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 57. In the most extensive and respected study to
date, Russell used a random sample of nine hundred thirty women in San Francisco for
her research. Id. Thirty-three female interviewers were selected to conduct the inter-
views. Id. Usually only one interview was necessary, with an average length of one hour
and twenty minutes per interview. Id. Anonymity and confidentiality were given great
importance by all the participants. Id. at 29-41; see also D. FINKELHOR & K. YLLO,
supra note 1, at 205 (studying sex by physical force or threat correlated with type of
assailant). The study concluded that ten percent of six hundred women living in the
Boston metropolitan area, who had children aged six to fourteen, reported that a spouse
or cohabitating partner was the abuser. Id.
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toward marriage.11
Contemporary family law attempts to make spouses equal partners. 2
Women now have rights exclusive of those of their husbands; one ex-
ample is the right to choose to have an abortion without spousal con-
sent.13 Before common law countries will be able to reflect the present
notions of wives as equal, independent human beings, however, they
must modernize their laws regarding marital rape.
This Comment argues that to harmonize modern concepts of woman-
hood and marriage with the law, all common law countries should stat-
utorily abolish the spousal exemption for marital rape. Although some
countries have eliminated the spousal exemption, other countries retain
the archaic law. Part I of this Comment examines the history and ra-
tionale of the common law relating to the spousal exemption. Part II
presents and analyzes United States marital rape law, including a
state-by-state summary. Part III examines the marital rape laws of
other common law countries such as England, Scotland, New Zealand,
South Africa, Australia, and Canada. 4 Discussion in this section cen-
ters on both the benefits and the problems with these laws. Part IV
recommends the abolishment of the marital rape exemption in all com-
mon law countries, concluding that the exemption rationale is unsound
in modern times.
I. HISTORY AND RATIONALE OF THE COMMON LAW
A. IMPLIED CONSENT THEORY AND PROPERTY THEORIES
The common law theory behind a spousal exemption for rape is most
frequently attributed to Sir Matthew Hale, who asserted "but the hus-
band cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful
11. Kaganas & Murray, Rape in Marriage-Conjugal Right or Criminal Wrong?
1983 ACTA JURIDICA 125, 127 (1983).
12. Id.
13. See id. (stating that the husband's right to moderate chastisement has disap-
peared and he is no longer able to restrict his wife's freedom of movement); see also
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976) (holding that requiring
spousal consent to a woman's choice to have an abortion violated her constitutional
rights); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (extending the right of privacy to a
woman's choice to terminate her pregnancy with abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (finding within the Bill of Rights a penumbra or zone of
privacy rights that includes the right of all people to use contraception).
14. See infra notes 77-194 and accompanying text (discussing the marital rape ex-
emption in the specified common law countries). The selection of the specific countries
and states is based on the similarities of the legal systems in common law countries.
Such a comparison provides stronger lessons for homogeneous countries desiring a
change in their rape laws. The availability of information on sexual offense laws limited
the choice of foreign countries.
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wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife
hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot
retract."1 5 Although Hale did not invent this concept, he subscribed to
it as it had been accepted throughout history. 16 He focused on the con-
tractual terms of the marriage agreement, 7 advocating that the mar-
riage contract presumed irrevocable consent to sexual relations.' 8
A series of English cases refined Hale's rigid implied consent the-
ory.19 The cases provided glimpses into the beginning of the trend to-
ward exceptions in spousal immunity laws. Moreover, they indicated
the possible nonabsolute nature of what Hale deemed absolute consent.
R. v. Clarence'0 initiated the questioning of the soundness of Hale's
theory. Although the judges commented in obiter, four of the six judges
had some misgivings regarding Hale's doctrine. They theorized that
15. M. HALE, supra note 3, at 629.
16. Freeman, "But If You Can't Rape Your Wife Wholmi Can You Rape?". The
Marital Rape Exemption Re-examined, 15 FAM. L.Q. 1, 9 (1981). Since no authority
was cited and Hale was known as a stringent misogynist, it is quite possible that he did
create the marital exemption rule. Id. at 10; see also Comment, The Marital Exemp-
tion to Rape: Past, Present and Future, DEr. C.L. REV. 261, 263 n.13 (1978) (stating
that a review of earlier English law illustrates similar ideas). For example, from 1066
through 1307 an alleged rapist could go unpunished if the victim accepted the accused
as her husband with the consent of her parents and the judiciary. Id.
17. Comment, The Marital Exemption to Rape: Past, Present and Future, supra
note 16, at 263. But see Mitra, supra note 4, at 561 (attacking Hale's view with the
argument that spouses-to-be receive no information or options about the contract
terms, which makes it irrational to think that a woman gives all access of her body to
her husband at any time he wants it). Historically, the state has always held an interest
in the creation, termination, and obligations of a marriage as a contract in which the
woman transferred her proprietary rights to her husband; yet, in the modern era a
woman is not a property right. Id.; see also English, The Husband Who Rapes His
Wife, 126 NEw L.J. 1223, 1223 (1976) (stating that although Hale insisted that he
would not let a "legal fiction" corrode his rule, critics say that the whole rule is based
on the legal fiction of equating marriage with the wife giving her husband the right to
have intercourse with her whenever he desired).
18. See generally Backhouse & Schoenroth, A Comparative Study of Canadian
and American Rape Law, 7 CANADA-U.S. L.J. 173, 174 (1984) (noting widespread
acceptance of Hale's view until recent times).
19. See Note, To Have and To Hold: The Marital Rape Exemption and the Four-
teenth Amendment, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1256 (1986) [hereinafter Note, To Have
and To Hold] (citing Hale as the accepted authority on marital rape in the United
States because of his implied consent theory). But see Note, Rape and Battery Between
Husband and Wife, 6 STAN. L. REV. 719, 722 (1954) [hereinafter Note, Rape and
Battery Between Husband and Wife] (noting that the implied consent doctrine is not
factually sound because marriage does not always indicate consent to intercourse and
that the doctrine deprives a married woman of criminal law protections when she needs
them).
20. R. v. Clarence, 22 Q.B.D. 23 (1888). The defendant was charged with assault
causing bodily harm after he transmitted gonorrhea to his wife. Id. at 34 (Wills, J.,
dissenting) (commenting that if the husband told his wife about the possibility of infec-
tion, she should presumably be correct in refusing to have intercourse with him).
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marital rape could be possible in some cases if the wife refuses inter-
course and the husband uses violence to force the sexual act upon her."
The case of R. v. Clarke22 first dealt directly with the marital rape
issue. This case allowed for the indictment of the husband for the rape
of his wife when they were living apart under a court-issued separation
order. The court reasoned that the separation order had in effect re-
voked the wife's consent.23 In R. v. Miller,4 however, the court re-
gressed from its holding in R. v. Clark25 and declared that a husband
was only guilty of assault, not rape, when he forced his wife to have sex
with him after she filed a petition for divorce, but before the court
heard the action.26 Consistent with the case law, in R. v. O'Brien"7 the
court found a husband guilty of raping his wife after the wife peti-
tioned for divorce and received a decree nisi.28 Finally, in R. v. Steele"
the court found that a wife had revoked her consent where the husband
was living separately from his wife and had given an undertaking to the
court not to molest or assault her.30
21. R. v. Clarence, 22 Q.B.D. at 57. Justice Field stated that "[t]here may, I think,
be cases in which a wife may lawfully refuse intercourse, and in which, if the husband
imposed it by violence, he might be held guilty of a crime." Id. (Field, J. dissenting).
Justice Wills commented that the prospect of marital rape as an impossibility is one
"to which I certainly am not prepared to assent, and for which there seems to me to be
no sufficient authority." Id. at 33 (Wills, J., dissenting). Justice Smith stated that the
consent which was given at marriage must be revoked in order for the husband to be
guilty of rape. Id. at 37 (Smith, J.). Justice Hawkins advocated the idea of an implied
consent theory, but agreed that there were circumstances in which a husband could be
punished for rape of his wife (i.e., where the husband is diseased). Id. at 51 (Hawkins,
J., dissenting). Only two out of the six judges wholly espoused Hale's doctrine of im-
plied consent. Id. at 46 (Stephen, J., dissenting), 64 (Pollock, J., dissenting).
22. R. v. Clarke, [1949] 2 All E.R. 448 (Leeds Assizes).
23. Id. at 448-49. The court held that the woman was presumed to have consented
to intercourse with her husband when ordinary relations, a product of the marriage
contract, existed between the spouses. Id. However, a judicial order providing that the
wife was no longer required to cohabitate with husband effectively revoked ordinary
relations, thereby revoking automatic consent. Id.
24. R. v. Miller, [1954] 2 Q.B. 282 (Winchester Assizes).
25. R. v. Clark, [1949] 2 All E.R. 448 (Leeds Assizes).
26. R. v. Miller, 2 Q.B. at 290, 292. The court held that presenting a petition for
divorce had no legal effect on the marriage or its dissolution. Id. at 292. For example,
the court could reject the petition and the marriage would still stand. Id. Thus, a sim-
ple divorce petition could not lead one to infer that the wife revoked her consent. Id. at
290.
27. R. v. O'Brien, [1974] 3 All E.R. 663 (Crown Ct. Bristol).
28. Id. at 665. The court found that the difference between a pronouncement of a
decree nisi and a decree absolute in a marriage was a mere technicality. Id. The court
felt that the decree nisi clearly revoked the wife's consent. Id.
29. R. v. Steele, 65 Crim. App. 22 (C.A. 1976).
30. Id. at 25. The fact that the couple lived apart was indicative of the wife's non-
consent. Id. The husband's undertaking relieved the wife of her usual marital obliga-
tion. Id.
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Although the courts limited the Hale doctrine, they based their rea-
soning on Hale's theory of implied consent. 31 Matrimonial consent was
no longer always absolute, but only the marital contracts and special
marital circumstances revoked a married woman's consent;32 a wife re-
tained no ability to freely revoke her consent.
In addition to Hale's implied consent theory, the unities of persons
theory 33 provided a basis for the marital rape exemption. This theory
was premised on how marriage merged the identities of the husband
and wife into one-the husband.34 Thus, under the unities theory, rape
was impossible since a husband was incapable of raping himself.33 Fur-
thermore, society viewed a wife as her husband's property or chattel.30
Consequently, forced sexual intercourse was just a husband making ap-
propriate use of his property.37
B. SEPARATE SPHERES IDEOLOGY
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, every state in the United
States adopted the Married Women's Property Acts, which allowed
women to make contracts, to hold and convey property, and to sue and
be sued as if they were unmarried.38 The property arguments discussed
31. See Williams, Marital Rape-Time for Reform, 134 NEw L.J. 26, 26 (1984)
(stating that the cases modified Hale's absolutist approach by allowing prosecution of a
husband where the wife had obtained a legally enforceable order or undertaking, which
would effectively revoke the consent inherent in marriage).
32. See Backhouse & Schoenroth, supra note 18, at 175 (noting that Hale's irrevo-
cable consent had become revocable in limited situations such as when the wife had
obtained court orders or when both spouses agreed to separate). Other withdrawals of
consent, however, were not valid. Id.
33. See Note, To Have and To Hold, supra note 19, at 1256 (defining the unities
of persons theory as the wife being incorporated into the husband). The unities of per-
sons theory originated in the feudal doctrine of coverture, thus, legitimizing the view of
a married woman becoming her husband's chattel through marriage. Id.
34. Note, The Marital Rape Exemption, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 306, 310 (1977)
[hereinafter Note, The Marital Rape Exemption]. The author labels as a legal fiction
the rationale underlying the spousal exemption which makes a woman her husband's
property or other half. Id.
35. Id.; see Note, Sexual Assault: The Case for Removing the Spousal Exemption
from Texas Law, 38 BAYLOR L. REv. 1041, 1043 (1986)[hereinafter Note, Removing
the Spousal Exemption from Texas Law] (stating that a woman merging into her
husband's identity literally made rape impossible).
36. See Note, To Have and To Hold, supra note 19, at 1256 (stating that through
marriage,the unities of persons theory legitimized the propertization of women and that
women's status as chattel deprived married women of all civil identities).
37. See Freeman, supra note 16, at 16-17 (remarking that such an idea does not
support current ideological sentiments).
38. Note, The Marital Rape Exemption, supra note 34, at 310; see also Note,
Removing the Spousal Exemption from Texas Law, supra note 35, at 1044 (comment-
ing that after the adoption of the acts, women had separate legal identities and the law
recognized them as assault victims).
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as a basis for the marital rape exemption lost their persuasiveness be-
cause women were no longer classified as property; rather, they could
own property. The separate spheres ideology replaced the unities theory
as the basis for women's inequality. 39 This ideology effectively sepa-
rated the sexes by maintaining a woman's place in the home.40 Laws
traditionally did not infringe upon one's private home, thus, legal inter-
ference into a woman's sphere became an unlawful public intrusion.41
Even though married women supposedly gained freedoms similar to
those of unmarried women through the Married Women's Property
Acts,42 the home was still a sanctum in which they were not entitled to
the protections of rules or regulations.' 3
C. SPOUSAL EXEMPTION RATIONALES
A number of principles support the common law spousal rape exemp-
tion based on implied consent and the unities theory. The arguments
set forth below defend the common law spousal rape exemption. Evi-
dentiary problems make marital rape difficult to prove. 4 Without the
marital rape exemption, a vindictive wife may accuse her inno6ent hus-
band of rape to blackmail him into giving her a favorable property set-
tlement or custody arrangement in divorce proceedings .4 The criminal
39. Note, To Have and To Hold, supra note 19, at 1257-58. Under the separate
spheres ideology women were not naturally inferior, but naturally different. Id. Their
role was that of worthy wife and mother. Id.
40. Id. at 1257. Under this ideology, men occupy the public realms of politics and
the marketplace. Id.
41. Id. at 1258. No laws existed to control male power in the private arena. Id.
This resulted in the private subordination of women. Id.
42. See Note, Removing the Spousal Exemption From Texas Law, supra note 35,
at 1044 (commenting that after the adoption of the act, women had separate legal
identities).
43. See Note, To Have and To Hold, supra note 19, at 1258 (maintaining that
because the private sphere was unregulated, men were allowed to oppress women). Spe-
cifically, men were free to rape their wives. Id.
44. See Freeman, supra note 16, at 18 (noting that one rationale for supporting the
exemption is that in marital rape cases, witnesses are unlikely to be found, and lack of
consent is often difficult to prove). Because marital rape is difficult to prove, supporters
of the immunity argue that it is sound. Id.; see also Backhouse and Schoenroth, supra
note 18, at 179-80 (noting that consent is even more difficult to prove when the parties
have been married and previously have engaged in consensual sexual intercourse);
Note, The Marital Rape Exemption, supra note 34, at 314 (noting that the status of
marriage often causes jurors to infer a wife's consent); Temkin, Towards a Modern
Law of Rape, 45 MOD. L. REv. 399, 409 (1982)(noting that time makes proof of the
offense difficult to acquire). Moreover, a time lag often occurs between the rape and
the reporting of the rape to authorities. Id. This lag often adds to the decision not to
prosecute. Id.
45. See Backhouse & Schoenroth, supra note 18, at 178 (commenting that some
fear that if a wife could charge her husband with rape, she could get an unfair advan-
1989]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
charge of rape is not the appropriate or correct way to deal with the
marital rape conflict; family law provides a better alternative .4  Elimi-
nating spousal immunity invades the sacred family home and promotes
discord, thereby, preventing reconciliation. 7 The common law spousal
rape exemption also supports the belief that marital rape is less trau-
matic than other types of rape, such as stranger rape.4 8 A wife, after
deciding to press rape charges against her husband, may change her
mind and reconcile with her husband. 9
II. THE MARITAL RAPE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES
A. STATE LAW
In the United States, each state treats the marital rape exemption
differently. The laws vary from a complete spousal exemption80 to elim-
ination of marital exemption."' The states are grouped into nine sec-
tage over her ex-husband in a future property settlement); Note, The Marital Rape
Exemption, supra note 34, at 314 (stating that a justification for spousal immunity is
that scheming wives will lie about husbands raping them to punish or blackmail their
husbands).
46. See Freeman, supra note 16, at 20 (noting that supporters of the immunity
assert that family law is a better remedy than the criminal law because a woman can
bring divorce proceedings against her husband); Temkin, supra note 44, at 408-09
(claiming that family law is more adequate than criminal law to protect the family);
Note, The Marital Rape Exemption, supra note 34, at 316 (noting that supporters of
the exemption believe that assault and battery laws give effective protection to the
wife). This form of protection is often termed the alternative remedy rationale. Id.
47. See Backhouse & Schoenroth, supra, note 18, at 177 (stating that a common
rationale for keeping the immunity is that it retains the need for privacy necessary in a
marriage, and abolishing such an immunity would lead to marital collapse); Freeman,
supra note 16, at 17 (arguing that improving the marital relationship should be the
goal of the law); Note, The Marital Rape Exemption, supra note 34, at 315 (discuss-
ing the argument that intramarital rape prosecutions would block reconciliation and
promote discord); see also Temkin, supra note 44, at 409 (discussing how the "impetu-
ous conduct" of the victimized wife may prevent reconciliation); Williams, supra note
31, at 26 (claiming that repealing the spousal immunity would interfere with the com-
plex relationship of husband and wife). The rationale for this claim is since all marital
breakdowns cause problems, there is no need to bring in the criminal law and make it
more painful. Id.; Note, Rape and Battery Between Husband and Wife, supra note 22,
at 725 (deciding that rape is "ill-suited to marriage" because rape among married
persons is a "loss of control over an explosive but encouraged situation"). The husband
is less of a threat to the community than an ordinary rapist because he "exhibits a
highly specific reaction" and an ordinary rapist chooses his victim randomly. Id.
48. See Backhouse & Schoenroth, supra note 18, at 178 (refuting the argument
that spousal rape is less traumatic than other forms of rape).
49. See Williams, supra note 31, at 27 (expressing sympathy for the police who
carry out all of the pre-trial work without suspecting that the wife will refuse to
testify).
50. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-18(c)(1983) (stating expressly that a
spouse cannot be prosecuted for criminal sexual assault by his or her spouse).
51. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN § 2C:14-5(b) (West 1982) (eliminating their previ-
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tions according to their positions on marital rape."
Illinois, Mississippi, and Puerto Rico have a complete marital rape
exemption."3 Eight states do not provide a spousal exemption if the par-
ties are separated under court order.5 When the circumstances involve
separation, these states make allowances for the wife to get protection
when raped by her husband. Four states will not exempt the husband
from rape charges if the parties are living apart and one spouse files a
petition for divorce, annulment, separation, or separate maintenance.es
Such provisions help sidestep the issue of the wife's consent by pro-
claiming that circumstances such as separation change the legal mar-
riage into a nullity. Seven states claim no exemption if the parties are
living apart or if one spouse has initiated legal proceedings.,, Through
ous spousal exemption from the law).
52. See NATIONAL CENTER ON WOMEN AND FAMILY LAW, INC., MARITAL RAPE
EXEMPTION (1987) (forming a chart on marital rape laws on a state by state basis and
devising nine categories of marital rape exemptions to organize the state laws).
53. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-18(c) (1983). Illinois law states that "no per-
son may be charged [with criminal sexual assault] by his or her spouse." Id. The state
may convict a spouse of aggravated criminal sexual assault if the victim reports it
within thirty days of the assault to a law enforcement agency or the State's Attorney's
office. Id. If a court finds the delay justified, it can waive the thirty-day limit. Id.
Mississippi is silent on spousal immunity. Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65 (1985); P.R.
LAWS ANN. tit. 33, § 961-68 (1983).
54. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:41 (West 1986); 1989 Md. Laws 399. On May 5,
1989 the Maryland legislature revised their sexual offenses law. The exemption still
does not apply if the parties are living separately pursuant to a decree of limited di-
vorce, but now a husband can be prosecuted for rape if they are living separately pur-
suant to a written separation agreement executed by both spouses for at least six
months before the rape. Id. Additionally, if the couple is living together, the husband
can be prosecuted for rape only if he uses force (threat of force apparently does not
constitute an element of rape for married women as it does for all other women)
against the will and without the consent of his spouse. Id.; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.0102
(Vernon 1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-01 (1983) (exemplifying other states that
do not provide a spousal exemption for separated parties). The code also includes a
protection order for wives. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3103 (Purdon 1983); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-3-658 (Law. Co-op. 1977); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 22-22-1.1 (1985);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-402,407 (1979).
55. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-1 (West 1984); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. 510.010(3)
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1986). Kentucky concludes that spouses who are legally sepa-
rated are not married, which circumvents the marital rape exemption. Id.; MICH.
Comp. LAWS ANN. § 2340 (West 1980); see also State v. Hawkins, 428 Mich. 903,
903, 407 N.W.2d 366, 367 (1987) (holding that a husband was not exempt from rape
even though his wife's divorce petition was found invalid). The court felt that the sepa-
ration and the commission of a felony under the rape statute disclaimed any evidence
of the usual marital status. Id.; TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-610 (1979).
56. IDAHO CODE § 18-6-107(a) (1977). Idaho specifies that the parties must be
voluntarily living apart for at least one hundred and eighty days. Id.; KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-3503 (1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:41 (West 1986). Louisiana does not
allow a spousal exemption if the parties are living apart or if the abuser knows that the
court has issued a temporary restraining order or injunction against him. Id. at
14:41(c); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10 (1978); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.01(L)
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statutory exceptions, these states erode the marital exemption, but do
not completely address the problem. Thirteen states do not allow an
exemption if the parties are living apart.5 8 The parties do not need a
court order or separation agreement. While the clauses provide protec-
tion for some women, the general laws still promote the archaic spousal
immunity law.5 Twenty states have a partial or limited rape exemp-
tion. 0 Hawaii, Maine, Oregon, Vermont, Massachusetts, Nebraska,
(Anderson 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 111(B) (West 1984). Oklahoma's law
includes orders of protection, but requires the use or threat of the ability to execute
force or violence upon the victim. Id.; TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(C) (Vernon
1989).
57. See Note, Removing the Spousal Exemption From Texas Law, supra note 35,
at 1061 (discussing that courts have recognized that sexual assault is a criminal viola-
tion no matter what the relationship is between the victim and assailant). Because ra-
tionales supporting the traditional rule of the marital rape exemption no longer apply
in modern times, abolishing spousal immunity is the only logical extension of such con-
cepts. Id.
58. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1401.4, -1404-1406 (1978); COLO. REV. STAT. §
18-3-409 (1975); IOWA CODE ANN. tit. 709.2-.4 (West 1978); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-
3-65 (1985); Mississippi's non-exemption only applies to sexual battery. Id.; Mont.
Code Ann. tit. 45-5-511(2) (1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10E, -11 (1978); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-27.8 (1987). North Carolina does not allow for an exemption if the
couple is living apart with a written separation agreement. Id.; OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2907.02(A)(1), .12(A)(1) (Anderson 1986).
Ohio provides no exemption for first degree rape. Id. at 2907.02(A)(1). Ohio also
provides no exemption for rape by an instrument if the parties are living apart and the
perpetrator administers drugs or intoxicants to the victim by force, threat of force,
deception, or concealment for the purpose of preventing her resistance by impairing her
control and/or judgment. Id. at § 2907.12(A)(1).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 111(B)(4) (West 1984); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
3103 (Purdon 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-22-1.1 (1985). In South Dakota,
the victim must file a complaint within ninety days of the attack. Id.; TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 22.011(C) (Vernon 1983); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61(B) (1986).
In Virginia, the law does not provide a spousal exemption if the spouse performs the
sexual act using force, threat, or intimidation. Id. Furthermore, the parties must be
living apart at the time of the assault or, alternatively, the husband must have caused
physical injury by force or violence. Id. The victim must report the violation to the
proper agency within ten days of the assault. Id. There is a possibility of probation or a
suspended sentence for spousal cases only if the defendant goes through counseling or if
the court finds that it is in the best interest of the family unit and victim. Id. at § 18.2-
61 (C),(D).
59. See Note, Sexism and the Common Law: Spousal Rape in Virginia 8 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 369, 386 (1986) (claiming that Virginia law still preserves the com-
mon law concepts of marital rape because it provides dissimilar provisions for married
women and unmarried women); Note, Removing the Spousal Exemption from Texas
Law, supra note 35, at 1061 (stating that limited exceptions to the marital rape exemp-
tion only provide a halfway solution).
60. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-14-102-106 (1987). The Arkansas law on forcible rape
does not abolish the exemption. Id. Section 5-14-102 (general provision) provides an
express spousal exemption. Id. The legislative history and commentary, however, indi-
cate that no statutory exemption exists. NATIONAL CENTER ON WOMEN AND FAMILY
LAW, INC., MARITAL RAPE EXEMPTION, n.3 (1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 262 (West
1988). California supports a separate offense of spousal rape. Id.; CONN. GEN. STAT.
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Alaska, Florida, Georgia, New Jersey, the District of Columbia, Wis-
consin, Alabama, and New York have totally abolished the marital
rape exemption.61 The cohabitors rape exemption focuses on the dis-
ANN. § 53(a)-70 (West 1988). Connecticut has an exemption for lesser degrees of rape
and sexual assault, but not for first degree forcible rape. Id.; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §
763, 764 (1987). No exemptions exist for first and second degree rape, but exemptions
exist for sexual assault and sexual misconduct. Id.; HAw. REV. STAT. § 707-730-
734(1974); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.2-.4 (West 1979). Iowa has no spousal exemption
to first degree and second degree sexual abuse, and has no exemptions for third degree
sexual abuse. Id.; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3501-3502 (Vernon 1987); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:43.2 (West 1986). Louisiana no longer has marital exemptions for aggra-
vated sexual battery. Id.; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §252 (1985); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 609.349 (West 1987). Minnesota's marital exemption applies to statutory rape
and when the victim is mentally or physically disabled. Id.; MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 45-
5-503(1) (1985). Montana's exemption only applies to sexual intercourse without con-
sent. Id.; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.373 (Michie 1987). Nevada does not allow for
a spousal exemption if the assault is carried out under force or threat of force. Id.;
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2-:3, A:5 (1986). New Hampshire has a marital ex-
emption for statutory rape and from rape of women who are mentally deficient. Id.;
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-03 (1985). North Dakota does not provide a marital ex-
emption for first degree rape. Id.; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A)-.02(B),
.02(G), .12(A)(2), .12(C) (Anderson 1987). Ohio removed the marital exemption for
forcible rape and forcible rape with an instrument. Id.; 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 312
(Purdon 1983). Spousal sexual assault is a second degree felony in Pennsylvania. The
spousal exemption applies to all other sexual offenses. Id.; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-2, -
4, -6 (1988). Rhode Island retained the spousal exemption only for first degree assault
when the victim is incapacitated, mentally disabled, or physically helpless. Id. at § I 1-
37-2; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021 (Vernon 1989). Texas eliminated the exemp-
tion for aggravated sexual assault and where the parties are living apart or have initi-
ated legal proceedings for other degrees of sexual assault. Id. at 22.021; WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9A.44.010, .040, .050, .060 (1988). Washington abolished the marital
exemption for first and second degree rape, but the exemption exists for third degree
rape. Id.; W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-6 (1989). West Virginia established a separate crime
of sexual assault of a spouse, which applies only to first degree rape and carries a lesser
penalty then ordinary rape. Id.; Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-307 (1988). Wyoming's exemption
applies only to third and fourth degree rape, but it is removed for first and second
degree rape. Id.; V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 1701 (1988). The Virgin Islands has no
exemption for first degree rape, but applies the exemption to other sexual assault cases.
Id.
61. See, e.g., Merton v. State, 500 So. 2d 1301, 1305 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986)
(finding the marital rape exemption invalid and holding that the criminal code applies
to any female, which implies abolition of the cohabitor's exemption); see also Williams
v. State, 494 So. 2d 819, 828 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986) (abolishing the marital exemp-
tion for forcible sodomy).
ALASKA STAT. § 11-41.443 (1988). Alaska has a specific section termed "spousal
relationship no defense". Id.; D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2801 (1967). The statute is silent
with respect to the marital exemption, but marital rape cases are prosecuted. NA-
TIONAL CENTER ON WOMEN AND FAMILY LAW, INC., MARITAL RAPE EXEMPTION, n.45
(1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794-011 (West 1979). While Florida has no express exemp-
tion, spouses can be prosecuted. State v. Smith, 401 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981); State v. Rider, 449 So. 2d 903 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); GA. CODE ANN. §
16-6-1(a) (1988). Although Georgia has no express exemption, the court has held that
the Georgia statute covers husbands for rape prosecutions. Warren v. State, 255 Ga.
151, 336 S.E.2d 221 (Ga. 1985); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 22, ch. 277, § 39
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tinctions between legally married spouses and cohabitors and applies in
eight states.62
Five states follow the "voluntary social companion" rape exemption,
which may include an exemption for unmarried cohabitors or exemp-
tion for date rape situations.83 Each of these states approaches the issue
differently and applies it to different situations. The voluntary social
companion exemption expresses the concept that rape is impossible be-
tween any nonstranger with whom one already has a relationship. Such
reasoning directly applies to married women. Society's apparent lack of
understanding that intimate relationships do not erase a woman's right
of consent is a grave cause for concern.
B. MODEL PENAL CODE PROVISION
Analogous to the majority of the states, the Model Penal Code 4 pro-
vides a modern, yet, limited approach to marital rape. 5 Married men
(West Supp. 1988); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-730,-732 (1984); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-
A, § 252 (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-319, -320 (1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-
5(b) (West 1982). New Jersey affirmatively eliminated the exemption. Id.
New York case law explains the position on the spousal exemption. See People v.
Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 164, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207, 213, 474 N.E.2d 567, 573 (1984)
(declaring the partial marital rape exemption rule to be unconstitutional and abolishing
the marital rape exemption completely).
OR. REV. STAT. § 163.305 (1985); VT, STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252 (1988); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 940.225(6) (West Supp. 1988). Wisconsin expressly removes the marital
rape exemption. Id.
62. CONN. GEN STAT. ANN. §§ 53(a)-67(b) (West 1987). Cohabitation is a defense
in all rape cases, except first degree rape. Id.; IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.4 (West 1979).
Iowa allows for a cohabitors exemption in third degree sexual abuse, but not in first
and second degree sexual abuse. Id. at § 709.2 - .4; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3502, -3503
(Vernon 1987). Kansas has no cohabitor exemption for first and second degree sexual
abuse, but has an exemption for third degree sexual abuse. Id.; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
510.010(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1986). Kentucky defines marriage without regard
to the legal status, concentrating only on the fact that the individuals live together as
husband and wife. Id.; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.342 (West 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. §
764 (1986); MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 45-5-511(2) (1986); W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-1(c)(2)
(1989). West Virginia defines marriage as any couple living together as man and wife,
whether they are legally married or not. Id.
63. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 761(h) (1987). Delaware allows an exemption for
spouses and cohabitors in first degree rape if the abuser did not seriously injure the
victim physically, mentally, or emotionally. Id.; HAw. REV. STAT. § 707-730 (1987);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 252(3) (1985). Maine's exemption reduces the crime
of rape to a class B felony and applies only if the victim voluntarily engaged in sexual
conduct with the defendant at the time of the sexual act. Id.; MONT. CODE ANN. tit.
45-5-11(3) (1986). Montana's exemption only applies when the victim is mentally inca-
pacitated and voluntarily and knowingly took an intoxicating substance. Id.; 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3101 (Purdon 1983).
64. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
65. See S. ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 74 (1987) (commenting on the rather typical ap-
proach to expand immunity to cohabitating parties but also to impose limits such as
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are immune from rape prosecution."6 Legal separation, however, re-
vokes such immunity.67 Thus, a legally recognized marriage is not a
prerequisite for a husband to rape his wife, but it is necessary in order
to take away the power to rape. 8
The commentators to the Code stress the importance of a prior inti-
mate relationship before the rape, which to them implies a generalized
consent.69 Therefore, at the very least, they argue that a husband must
be exempt from rape based on presumed incapacity of the woman to
consent.70 Moreover, the commentators justify the modern code on the
basis that penal law is an unwarranted intrusion into family life.71 Basi-
cally, the commentators exhort all of the common law rationales to
support a Model Code that is not a just model for married women.
C. CRITICISM OF UNITED STATES LAW
Much criticism surrounds the various laws of the United States.
Only fourteen states (including the District of Columbia) have totally
abolished the marital rape exemption, 72 while the other states adjust
their marital rape laws, but refuse to go all the way and accept the
concepts of the modern female and marriage. Instead they attach
themselves to the common law rationales.
Moreover, the marital rape exemption elicits constitutional implica-
tions by impermissibly infringing upon a married woman's right to pri-
vacy by unconstitutionally placing conditions on a woman's right to
marry.7,3 The exemption also discriminates against all women, thereby
violating the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 74
judicial separation).
66. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 231.1 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (specifying
that inherent in the definition of rape is that the victim is not the man's wife).
67. See id. (stating the general provisions applicable to the spousal relationship in
the crime of rape).
68. S. ESTRICH, supra note 65, at 74-75.
69. See 2 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES, 244-46 (1980) (stating that the
relationship creates a presumption of consent that is valid until it is revoked by separa-
tion or divorce).
70. See id. (citing an example of a man having intercourse with his unconscious
wife).
71. See id. (claiming that the marital relationship cannot adjust itself if spouses are
subject to penal sanctions).
72. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (listing the states that abolish the
spousal exemption).
73. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's de-
velopment of the right to privacy embodied in the Bill of Rights).
74. See Note, To Have and To Hold, supra" note 19, at 1272-73 (explaining how
rights analysis and gender discrimination law offer women the means to gain equality
through the legal system in marital rape). The rights analysis takes a straightforward
approach toward individual victims, while the gender discrimination approach forces
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Most importantly, the exemption's concepts are outmoded. The modern
principle of equality in marriage disputes such an exemption.75 Such
equality must permeate the legal system's reality. Because the law
often rests on prosecutorial discretion, prosecutors' attitudes must
change along with the law for the rules to protect women adequately.76
In these modern times, changes still need to occur in the United
States. Specifically, every state, not just fourteen states, must totally
repeal spousal exemptions to their rape laws. Providing limitations for
the spousal exemptions, such as permitting it in cases of legal separa-
tion, as provided in the Model Penal Code, does not truly embrace the
idea that a woman's consent to sexual relations resides solely within
her. The formalistic act of marriage does not suddenly change this.
Only abolition of the exemption tells society that marriage does not
take away a woman's will.
III. MARITAL RAPE LAWS OF COMMON LAW
COUNTRIES
A. STATUTORY ABOLITION OF THE MARITAL RAPE EXEMPTION
1. New Zealand
a. Rape Law Reform (No. 2) Act of 1985
The New Zealand Rape Law Reform (No. 2) Act of 1985 (Rape
Reform Act)77 specifically abolished spousal immunity in rape cases.7 8
the courts to view the marital rape exemption as a thorn in the side of all women. Id.
75. See Freeman, If You Can't Rape Your Wife Who[m] Can You Rape, supra
note 16, at 8 (commenting that women are no longer perceived as pawns in the marital
market, however, leftover residue from opposite, archaic notions is the basis of the
spousal exemption); Note, The Marital Rape Exemption, supra note 34, at 323 (con-
cluding that because the underlying rationales are outdated, the courts and legislatures
should decide that the spousal exemption has no place in modern criminal law); Com-
ment, Warren v. State: One Attempt to Modernize the Marital Rape Exemption, 10
Am. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 157, 169-70 (1986) (stating that the change of women's status in
American society began to move the trend away from the marital rape exemption,
suggesting that modern courts will leave behind the common law views on marital
rape).
76. See Jeffords, Prosecutorial Discretion in Cases of Marital Rape, 9 Vic-
TIMOLOGY 415, 423-24 (1984) (finding that according to a mail survey, prosecutors in
states where a spousal exemption for rape did not exist were less likely to think that
maximum charges would be filed in marital rape cases as opposed to stranger rape
cases).
77. Rape Law Reform (No. 2) Act of 1985, N.Z. Stat., reprinted in Simpkin,
Rape Law Reform (No. 2) Act 1985, 5 AUKLAND U.L. REv. 514 (1987). The act
consists of amendments to the Crimes Act of 1961, the Evidence Act of 1908, and the
Summary Proceedings Act of 1957. Id.
78. The Crimes Amendment Act (No. 3) of 1985, N.Z. Stat., reprinted in
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The legislative change occurred through the recognition of the archaic
concept of women as chattels and the view of rape as a property crime
against a woman's father or husband.78 Through the Rape Reform Act,
New Zealand acknowledged rape as a crime of assault.8 0
b. Advantages of the Abolition of Spousal Immunity
Previous rape law required a husband and wife to live in separate
residences at the time of the intercourse for the husband to be guilty of
rape.8l Finding no cogent arguments to retain this law,82 the legislature
enacted the Rape Reform Act.83 Opponents argue that the changes are
too extensive.8 4 Others, however, praise the Rape Reform Act as a
modernistic approach.8 5 New Zealand's straightforward rape law elimi-
nates any doubts surrounding the possible prosecution of a spouse by
creating neither exceptions nor specified circumstances under which
marital rape must occur.
A 1987 court of appeal's case, R v. N (an accused),0 demonstrates
the effectiveness of the new rape law. At issue was the appellant hus-
band's three year prison term he received for raping his wife at knife-
point. At the time of the rape, the husband was separated from his wife
but maintained frequent contact.8 7 The court of appeal stated that just
Simpkin, supra note 77, at 514. Section 128(4) of the Act states that "a person may be
convicted of sexual violation in respect of sexual connection with another person not-
withstanding that those persons were married to each other at the time of that sexual
connection." Id.
79. See Simpkin, supra note 77, at 517 (stating that although the theories gov-
erning rape were outdated, Scotland needed specific legislative reforms because the
courtroom continued to express these theories).
80. See id. (commenting that acknowledging marital rape as a crime of assault
represents the contemporary attitude).
81. NEW ZEALAND COMMENTARY OF HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, ch. 79, at
33 (4th ed. 1983). Section C1 117, a provision which governs the offenses by one spouse
against the other, states that "a man cannot be convicted of the rape of his wife unless
they were living apart in separate residences at the time of intercourse. . . ." Id.
82. See Note, Proposed Reforms of the Law of Rape, 5 OTAGO L. REv. 489, 490
(1983) (implying that the original common law notion that a wife gives her irrevocable
implied consent to her husband's demands was too outdated to justify the immunity);
Barrington, The Rape Law Reform Process in New Zealand, 8 CRnii. L.J. 307, 317(1984) (focusing on the lack of real or logical arguments to retain spousal immunity).
83. Rape Law Reform (No. 2) Act of 1985, N.Z. Stat., construed in Simpkin,
supra note 77, at 514.
84. Barrington, Standing in the Shoes of the Rape Victim: Has the Law Gone Too
Far?, 4 NEW ZEALAND L.J. 408, 408 (1986). Because feminist groups presented the
majority of submissions to the two Select Committees on the Rape Law Reform bills,
some may argue that Parliament prematurely capitulated under this pressure. Id.
85. See id. at 411 (concluding that the law has not "gone too far").
86. R v. N (an accused), 2 N.Z.L.R. 268 (C.A. 1987).
87. Id. at 268. When the wife did not respond to her husband's request of ending
1989]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
because the parties are married, no separate sentencing regime is nec-
essary in rape cases. 88 The court's rationale specifically noted that par-
liament made no distinction between spousal rape and other rapes be-
cause all rapes produce the same severity of outrage and violation.89
This decision illustrates how a statute that abolishes the spousal ex-
emption comes to the aid of married women in need of protection and
justice. Without the benefit of the Rape Law Reform Act, the success-
ful prosecution of such a violent man, who happened to be the victim's
husband, would not have occurred.
2. Canada
Along with New Zealand, Canada rejects the marital rape exemp-
tion through statutory abolition. Canada's criminal code originally de-
fined rape to include the usual spousal exemption. 90 Thus, according to
the statute, a man could not rape his wife; no exceptions existed. More-
over, as of 1983, no reported cases existed where the accused and com-
plainant were married at the time of the sexual act.9 Therefore, the
only way to abolish or reduce the scope of the exemption was through
statutory amendment.9
In 1983, the Parliament of Canada amended the criminal code to
abolish the exemption.9" This represents clear progress for the married
the separation, she was raped by him in her bedroom with a kitchen knife as her hus-
band's weapon. Id.
88. Id. at 270. The court squarely addressed the issue of the possibility of marital
rape even though the defense counsel did not use the fact of the marriage in itself to
justify a reduced penalty for the accused. Id. Defense counsel tried to advance the
claims of a troubled marital history (i.e., defendant's personality and sexuality prob-
lems), which the court flatly rejected. Id.
89. Id. The court claimed that the circumstances of each case, inter-spousal and
otherwise, governed the principles of sentencing. Id. at 271. Individual reactions to the
crime were directly relevant to the court's penalty. Id. at 270. Because the wife in the
present case suffered from the typical traumatic effects of rape, this played a large role
in the jail sentence for her husband. Id. at 271.
90. CRIMINAL CODE, ch. 29, § 266 (Can. 1892). The Code states that "rape is the
act of a man having carnal knowledge of a woman who is not his wife without her
consent." Id. The Criminal Code was updated in 1970, but still included the immunity
in its definition of rape. "A male person commits rape when he has sexual intercourse
with a female person who is not his wife..." An Act Respecting the Criminal Law,
CAN. REV. STAT. ch. C-34 § 143 (1970).
91. Backhouse & Schoenroth, supra note 18, at 176.
92. Id.
93. An Act To Amend the Criminal Code in Relation to Sexual Offenses, R.S.C.,
ch. 125, § 246.8 (Can. 1983). The act states that:
A husband or wife may be charged with an offence under section 246.1 [sexual
assault], 246.2 [sexual assault with a weapon, threats to a third party or causing
bodily harm], or 246.3 [aggravated sexual assault] in respect of his or her spouse
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women of Canada.94 The judicial process will ultimately test the effec-
tiveness of the law.
3. Australia-Victoria
a. Crimes (Sexual Offenses) Act of 1980
Marital rape law underwent two major revisions in Victoria.9" At
common law, the Victorian husband held a position similar to that of
the English husband."' The position changed, however, with the Crimes
(Sexual Offenses) Act9" in 1980. The Act removed spousal immunity if
the spouses were living separately,9 8 and used the term sexual penetra-
tion instead of sexual intercourse.99
b. Crimes (Amendment) Act of 1985
The Act of 1980 raised two questions. First, if the spouses were not
living separately and apart, could a husband still be liable for rape?100
Second, what exactly does separately and apart mean?201 Perhaps as a
whether or not the spouses are living together at the time the activity that forms
the subject matter of the charge occurred.
Id.; see Temkin, Women, Rape and Law Reform, in RAPE 16, 34 (1986) (commenting
that in Canada, unlike in England, the new legislation was the direct result of the
fervent lobbying of women's organizations).
94. See Temkin, supra note 93, at 34 (mentioning the symbolic achievements of
the new law as raising the status of married women in the legal system).
95. See Corns, Liability of Husbands for Rape-In-Marriage-The Victorian Po-
sition, 7 CRIM. L.J. 102, 102-12 (1983) (discussing reforms in Victoria's spousal immu-
nity laws).
96. See id. at 102-103 (commenting that the husband had immunity from prose-
cution for first degree rape of his wife with the usual exceptions inherent in the com-
mon law).
97. Crimes (Sexual Offenses) Act of 1980, Vict. Acts (Austl.).
98. Id. at § 62(2). Section five adds the following:
(2) [W]here a married person is living separately
and apart from his spouse the existence of the
marriage shall not constitute, or raise any
presumption of, consent by one to an act of
sexual penetration with the other or to an
indecent assault (with or without aggravating
circumstances) by the other.
Id.
99. Id. at § 4(d)(2); see also Corns, supra note 95, at 103 (discussing the defini-
tion of sexual penetration which makes it possible for a husband to be guilty of raping
his wife even if sexual intercourse (per vaginam) did not occur).
100. Corns, supra note 95, at 103. No clear answer has been resolved, only specula-
tion has resulted. Id. at 107.
101. Id. at 103. To establish if the spouses were living separately and apart, the
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reaction to these rhetorical questions, the Parliament again changed
the rape law. The Crimes (Amendment) Act of 1985102 effectively an-
swered these problems when it totally eliminated the spousal exemp-
tion. 10 3 Presently, a husband, no matter what his living circumstances
are, may be liable for rape. This approach prompts no question of when
a rape could apply to a husband-wife situation and recognizes a mar-
ried woman as an individual with independent rights.
4. Australia-New South Wales
a. Statutory Law
In New South Wales, the law delineates unlawful sexual intercourse
into three categories. Category one is the infliction of grievous bodily
harm with intent to have intercourse (most serious). 0 Category two is
the infliction of actual bodily harm with intent to have intercourse.'00
Category three is sexual intercourse without consent (least serious). 100
Because the law abolishes spousal immunity, each category of rape ap-
plies to husbands.10 7
court must examine the total marital relationship. Id. at 111.
102. Crimes (Amendment) Act of 1985, § 10, Vict. Acts (Austl.).
103. Id. Section ten of the amendment substituted the following for section 62 of
the Principal Act: "(2) [T]he existence of a marriage does not constitute, or raise any
presumption of, consent by a person to an act of sexual penetration with another person
or to an indecent assault (with or without aggravating circumstances) by another per-
son." Id.
104. Crimes (Sexual Assault) Amendment Act of 1981, No. 42, § 61B, N.S.W.
Stat. (Austl.). This offense is described as "inflicting grievous bodily harm with intent
to have sexual intercourse." Id.; see Cunliffe, Consent and Sexual Offences Law Re-form in New South Wales, 8 CRIm. L.J. 271, 275 (1984) (reprinting the same provi-
sions, when they were part of the Crimes Act of 1900 (N.S.W.)).
105. Crimes (Sexual Assault) Amendment Act of 1981, No. 42, § 61C, N.S.W.
Stat. (Austl.). This sexual assault category is termed as "infliction actual bodily
harm. . .with intent to have sexual intercourse." Id.
106. Crimes (Sexual Assault) Amendment Act of 1981, § 61D, N.S.W. Stat.(Austl.). Category three is defined as "sexual intercourse without consent." Id. A
fourth category exists, however it relates to indecent assaults and acts of indecency. Id.
at § 61E.
107. Crimes (Sexual Assault) Amendment Act of 1981, § 61A(4), N.S.W. Stat.
(Austl.).
61A(4) The fact that a person is married to a person-(a) upon whom an offence
under section 61B, 61C, or 61D is alleged to have been committed shall be no
bar to the first-mentioned person being convicted of the offence; or (b) upon
whom an offence under any of those sections is alleged to have been attempted
shall be no bar to the first mentioned person being convicted of the attempt.
[VOL. 4:555
MARITAL RAPE EXEMPTION
b. No Marital Rape Exemption-Problems and Benefits
Although the rape law acknowledges a married woman's right to
nonconsent, it also prompts complaints. One example of such com-
plaints is that a vague law intruding upon a couple's marriage bed is
not appreciated. 108 In addition, the provision's wording complicates the
situation. It is unclear whether the threatened person (who could be a
third party, e.g., a wife's child) or the person actually attacked is the
person "upon whom" an offense is committed, and, therefore, able to
bring a successful prosecution.01 Voluntariness and consent are no
longer the issues they should be for marital rape cases.110 Instead, the
marital rape law focuses on an abstract notion of not desiring to have
intercourse rather than whether the person nonetheless voluntarily had
sexual relations. 1 Furthermore, abolishing the spousal immunity with-
out defining what is sexually permissible (i.e., only sexually indecent)
within a marriage makes the law overinclusive by opening up the op-
portunity to punish spouses who think the acts are just indecent rather
than illegal.11
Despite other countries' admiration of the modern policies of New
South Wales, critics who view the statute as overinclusive fear that
protecting wives will interfere with husbands' marital rights. Such an
opinion, however, ignores other countries, such as New Zealand, Ca-
nada, and the state of Victoria, that maintain a similar law with no
apparent problem of overinclusiveness. Also forgotten is a married wo-
man's right of nonconsent. Protecting this right is more important than
justifying an irrational idea of a man retaining a right to sex in mar-
riage whenever he desires.
108. See Cunliffe, supra note 104, at 292 (arguing that the law neither clearly
indicates whether marriage provides implied consent for indecent assault nor ade-
quately defines indecent assault).
109. See id. at 291 (stating an example that if a husband assaults or threatens to
assault a child to force his wife to have intercourse with him, he could profit from the
immunity because the child is the person upon whom the offense was committed al-
though the act of forcing was against the spouse).
110. See id. at 293-94 (noting that commentators sometimes fail to recognize that
give-and-take is inherent in the marital relationship). Commentators argue that the test
for rape should focus on voluntariness and not on whether the person can say that she
did not want to engage in sexual activity at that time. Id.
111. See id. at 293 (citing examples of women stating that they have sex all the
time with their husbands when they do not genuinely want to, but they have the sex
voluntarily just to get some peace from their husband's demands).
112. Id. at 295. This can be solved by abolishing the spousal immunity along with
defining what is sexually permissible in marriage. Id.
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5. Analytical Summary
Canada, New Zealand, and the .Australian states of Victoria and
New South Wales have made complete reforms in their rape laws by
declaring marital rape illegal. Canada, New Zealand, and New South
Wales revamped their old statutes to extend the modern mores of
women into the law. Victoria initially only wanted to provide immunity
for spouses in the case of separation. However, the discovery that such
an approach would create more questions involving the circumstances
constituting separateness and still leave married women unprotected
prompted total abolition of the immunity as the only clear answer. The
statutory reforms of all the above countries have their share of tradi-
tional common law based critics proclaiming the law should not invade
the home; yet, legislatures making new acts for marital reform send out
a message that societies hold married women to be human beings, with
the right of consent equal to all other women.
B. No STATUTORY ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF MARITAL RAPE, YET
JUDICIAL REFORM
1. England
a. Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act of 1976 and Its Effects
England's marital rape law closely corresponds to the laws in the
majority of American states because it provides exceptions to the
spousal exemption, yet, strongly adheres to the traditional common law.
The Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act of 1976111 contains the provi-
sions of the rape law in England. The Act accepts the basic proposition
that a husband cannot be guilty of raping his wife.114 The common law,
however, provides four exceptions. 1 5 First, the exemption will not ap-
ply if a wife obtains a separation order which contains a noncohabita-
tion clause from a magistrate's court.' 6 Second, it will also not apply if
113. Sexual Offenses (Amendment) Act of 1976, ch. 82 (Eng.).
114. See id. at § 1 (defining rape as a man having unlawful sexual intercourse with
a woman; unlawful traditionally means a nonmarital context); see also J.F. ARCHBOLD,
PLEADING, EVIDENCE, AND PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES 1794 (1982) [hereinafter
ARCHBOLD] (maintaining that the law encompasses Hale's general concept and accepts
it as the basis of the law by stating that a husband can not be guilty of rape upon his
wife).
115. See ARCHBOLD, supra note 114 at 1794 (1982)(stating that the common law
exceptions to Hale's general proposition are based on the fact that the court orders
eliminate the wife's matrimonial consent, which she has given to her husband through
marriage as a matter of law). Only through the law can a married woman effectively
revoke her consent in order for a charge of rape to apply to her husband. Id.
116. See R. v. Clark, 2 All E.R. at 448 (explaining how such an order precludes
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a couple separates and signs a separation agreement that includes a
nonmolestation clause.117 Third, it will not apply if a wife initiates di-
vorce proceedings and obtains an injunction forbidding her husband
from molesting her.118 Fourth, the court will not apply the exemption if
a court grants a wife a decree nisi in divorce proceedings.11 0 The law,
however, does not give a husband immunity from aiding and abetting
another person to rape his wife.120 In addition, if a husband uses force
or violence when exercising his rights to intercourse, the charge of
wounding or assaulting his wife may stand.'2 '
Parliament passed The Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act of 1976
as a result of the decision in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Mor-
gan. 22 In Morgan, the public's reaction of shock over the acquittal of
the men in a rape trial prompted the formation of a committee to ex-
amine the laws governing sexual offenses. 23 The committee, however,
did not examine marital rape.1
24
application of the exemption).
117. See R. v. Miller, 2 Q.B. at 282 (distinguishing the application of the spousal
exemption in the case of such a separation agreement).
118. See R. v. Steele, 65 Crim. App. at 22 (stating that initiating divorce proceed-
ings permits the inapplication of the spousal exemption).
119. See R. v. O'Brien, 3 All E.R. at 663 (stating that a decree nisi, a decree made
in an undefended suit which dissolves the marriage on the ground that the husband
behaves in such a way that his wife can not be expected to live with him, effectively
brought the marriage to an end). The difference between a decree nisi and a decree
absolute is only a technicality for the existence of a marriage. Id.
120. ARCHBOLD, supra note 114, at 1794. Archbold states that "both a husband
and a boy under 14 may be aiders and abettors." Id.
121. Id. at 1794. Archbold comments that "a husband is not entitled to use force or
violence for the purpose of exercising his right to intercourse, and if he does, though he
is not guilty of rape, he may be guilty of wounding or assault." Id.
122. Director of Public Prosecutions v. Morgan, [1975] 2 All E.R. 347. The House
of Lords decided that a man should not be found guilty of rape if he honestly believed
that the woman consented to sexual intercourse, even if the belief was unreasonable. Id.
The case involved a man who invited three men to go to his house and have sex with
his wife. Id. He added that she may struggle a bit, however, she enjoyed this as a
prelude to sex. Id. The men followed the husband's directions, and they (husband and
the men) were subsequently found not guilty of rape because the husband's directions
proved that they honestly believed the wife wanted to have sex with them. Id.
123. See Freeman, supra note 16, at 27 (commenting that a female judge chaired a
committee to look into the law of rape as a result of the'decision in Morgan); M.
BENN, A. COOTE & T. GILL, THE RAPE CONTROVERSY 11 (1986) (commenting on the
effects of the Morgan decision). The protests from women's groups and some Members
of Parliament prompted the Home Secretary to appoint an advisory group, headed by
Mrs. Justice Heilbron, to examine the rape law. Id. The group recommended changes
to the existing law, which were presented as a Private Member's Bill to Parliament. Id.
This bill was subsequently passed as the Sexual Offenses (Amendment) Act of 1976.
Id.
124. See Freeman, supra note 16, at 27 (commenting on the history of the legisla-
tion, which belies its final traditional common law construction). Although the laws on
marital rape did not change at its committee stage in the House of Commons, an
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The Criminal Law Revision Committee (CLRC), 1"3 in consultation
with the Policy Advisory Committee on Sexual Offenses (PAC), 20 pro-
vided a broader review of sexual crimes when they published their fif-
teenth report dealing with sexual offenses in 1984.27 Their recommen-
dations included the topic of marital rape. 2 ' Only a narrow majority of
the committee favored retaining the present law. 112 They reasoned that
a husband rapist is not as threatening as a stranger rapist, °30 despite
the definition of rape as nonconsensual sexual intercourse.13' The
CLRC also noted the inappropriateness of imprisonment in marital
rape cases, especially when no physical injury has occurred.' 82 They
viewed marital rape as "involving violence, in the sense of injury but
not as an offense of violence itself.' 33 The Committee appropriated the
amendment that would have removed the spousal immunity provision entirely was
moved and carried. Id. The provision stated "'[i]n any prosecution on a charge of rape
a woman shall not be presumed to have consented to intercourse with a man only on
the ground that she is his wife.'" Id. (quoting PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 21 (Mar. 24,
1976), Official Report of Standing Committee F.) Unfortunately, the amendment to
the bill was not included in the final Act. Id.
125. See Wells, Law Reform, Rape and Ideology, 12 J. OF L. Soc'Y 63, 63 (1985)
(explaining that the CLRC is a part-time group of seventeen lawyers, two of whom are
women, that examines matters which the Home Secretary refers to them).
126. See Wells, supra note 125, at 63 (defining the group as consisting of fifteen
members, four from the CLRC and the rest from the areas of social work and proba-
tion, seven of whom were women).
127. CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMMITTEE, SEXUAL OFFENSES, 1984, CMND. SER.
4 No. 9213.
128. Id. at part XIV. The committee concluded that:
(10) We recommend that the offence of rape be extended to enable a prosecu-
tion to be brought for rape where a man has sexual intercourse with his wife
without her consent when the two are not cohabitating with each other. We are,
however, divided over whether the offence of rape should be further extended to
all cases of non-consensual sexual intercourse within marriage.
Id.
129. See Wells, supra note 125, at 65 (commenting that the majority of the PAC
were in favor of totally abolishing the spousal immunity). Without this support, it was
likely that more members would have been in favor of retaining the present law. Id.
130. Id. at 70. Wells explains that under English law the gravamen of rape is the
injury caused to the wife, not the forced sexual act. Id. Sexual relations in marriage
often involve a compromise, especially by the wife. Id. Thus, forced intercourse within
a sexual relationship is rape only if it is violent. Id. If it is violent, however, then it is
not truly rape unless a serious injury results. Id. Therefore, for a rape to occur under
English law there must be violence and no sexual relationship.
13 1. See id. (assuming that the false stereotype of the "real rapist" which is that of
a stranger, not a person known to the victim, influenced the Committee).
132. See id. at 70-71 (asserting that this idea is a result of the belief that marital
rape is the least serious, violence is rather serious, and nonmarital rape is the most
serious).
133. Id. at 71. The CLRC, because it focuses on physical injury and equates it
with violence, overlooks the emotional and traumatic effects of marital rape. Id. at 70.
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myth of equating the stranger rapist with the real rapist, and, there-
fore, did not recommend appropriate changes in the marital rape law to
conform to modern notions of rape.134
Although other bills in Parliament discussed sexual offenses reform,
the refusal to eliminate the marital rape exemption continued. For ex-
ample, the disappointing Sexual Offences Bill"15 failed to change the
marital rape law.136 This overlooked the whole trauma and significance
of marital rape.137
b. Expansion of the Sexual Offenses (Amendment) Act of 1976-
R. v. Reeves and R. v. Roberts
Despite the legislature's stagnancy in implementing marital rape leg-
islation, recent case law addressing the marital rape issue is encourag-
ing to women. Two cases illustrate the British judiciary's expansion of
the marital rape lav to provide justice for victims. The court of appeal
in R. v. Reeves'38 defined the circumstances when the wife's conduct
waived a nonmolestation or noncohabitation injunction against her hus-
band. 39 The court held that the correct rule on resuming cohabitation
was that the husband and wife "voluntarily resumed the matrimonial
relationship and had become once more husband and wife in the ordi-
nary sense."'40 This fair approach relies on the total renewal of the
marriage, but that result may reflect the horrifying facts of the case-a
husband forcing sex upon his bedridden, cancer-stricken wife."'
Therefore, the CLRC views marital rape as not serious and nonmarital rape (which by
the Committee's view, includes violence) as serious. Id. at 70-71.
134. See id. at 72 (concluding that CLRC neglected to consider the contemporary
values of society when it decided on legal reforms). The CLRC was unsuccessful be-
cause it failed to realize that Victorian laws should only be applied to Victorian ethics.
Id.
135. See A New Approach to Sexual Offences, 135 NEw L.J. 93, 94 (1984) (not-
ing that the bill received all party support).
136. See id. at 93 (noting that the bill did not create an offense for marital rape).
137. See id. (criticizing the bill for ignoring the deep trauma and injury that wives
incur when they suffer marital rape, and asserting that marital rape is not an uncom-
mon occurrence).
138. R. v. Reeves, [1983] 5 Crim. App., reprinted in 48 J. CRIM. L. 352 (1984).
139. R. v. Reeves, 48 J. CRIM. L. at 352.
140. Id. at 353. The trial judge directed the jury on this rule, but after the judge
convicted the defendant of rape and sentenced him to four years imprisonment, the
defendant appealed. Id. He argued that the judge should have directed the jury that
once his wife allowed him to do the acts incompatible with her injunction, she had
waived the injunction. Id. The court of appeals agreed with the trial judge. Id.
141. Id. The defendant's wife had obtained an injunction against him not to molest,
interfere, contact her, or come within a quarter of a mile of her house. Id. When she
was ill with cancer and unable to leave her bed, however, the defendant entered her
house, pulled her clothes off, forced her to have sexual intercourse with him, and stayed
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The court of appeals in R. v. Roberts'4 2 concluded that a husband
was guilty of raping his wife despite the lack of a nonmolestation
clause in the deed of separation.,4 3 Thus, this case could represent that
a wife may effectively revoke her consent by a simple separation agree-
ment without the inclusion of a nonmolestation clause. Such an ad-
vancement allows a greater opportunity for prosecution under marital
rape law.144
c. Criticism of British Law
Although the trend that the British judiciary adopts is a moderniza-
tion of the previous approaches, additional measures need to material-
ize for an effective resolution. England must criminalize marital
rape.' 45 Although a man is married to a woman, he does not have un-
limited sexual rights over her.146 In addition, even though the Sexual
Offences (Amendment) Act retains the traditional exemption to the
marital rape law and leaves the judiciary to propose exceptions to the
rule, the exceptions of divorce and separations effectively remove the
parties from the marital context. Therefore, the law still recognizes the
concept of a marital rape impossibility. If reform of sexual offenses is
indicative of a society's progress in sexual equality and integrity, the
Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act of 1976 and the CLRC's work
show England has made little progress for the rights of women. 147
in the house for several days afterwards. Id.
142. R. v. Roberts, construed in CRIM. L.R. 188-89 (1986).
143. Id. In June 1984 the court arranged an ouster order, commanding the hus-
band out of the home. Id. The court also issued a restraining order that prevented the
husband from molesting or going near his wife for two months. Id. A formal deed of
separation that did not contain a noncohabitation or nonmolestation clause was
granted. Id.
The husband argued that expiration of the injunction in August 1984 revived his
wife's consent to intercourse. Id. The judge held that although the wife's consent had
already terhninated, the facts of the case coupled with the nonmolestation clause in the
separation deed did not revoke the wife's consent. Id.
144. Id. at 189. The commentary on the case suggests that although the law on
rape still insists that a wife cannot unilaterally revoke her consent, a wife may revoke
her consent with a simple agreement with her husband. Id. On the other hand, the case
could merely represent that a deed of separation is as effective in revoking consent as a
deed with a nonmolestation clause. Id.
145. See BENN & COOTE, supra note 123, at 26 (adding that the courts should
consider the nature of the parties' relationship before reading a verdict and sentencing
the husband).
146. See id. (arguing that the law should not give men the right to have forced,
nonconsensual intercourse with their wives by virtue of the circumstance of marriage).
147. See Wells, supra note 125, at 72 (commenting on the CLRC's failure to
change the law to reflect current values of personal integrity for married women);
Temkin, supra note 93, at 38-40 (stating that England's lack of progress was due to the
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2. Scotland
a. Attempt to Change Traditional Common Law View
The traditionally conservative statutory rape law of Scotland and the
tempering influence of Scotland's judiciary parallel those of England.
In Scotland, the history of rape law rests on Hume's view that a hus-
band cannot rape his wife.148 Since statutory law is silent on the matter
of marital rape,149 Hume's common law view stands.
One of the first signs of reform for married women was the case of
H.M. Advocate v. Duffy. 50 Lord Robertson took issue with Hume's
views and thereby encouraged the development of Scottish rape law.
He noted that no Scottish case on marital rape existed (common law
governs the marital rape issue) and he criticized the idea of the marital
rape exemption.1"" While the Duffy holding did not unvaryingly exempt
a husband from prosecution for rape, it did not make him invariably
liable for marital rape.152 The Duffy principles, which do not bar a hus-
band from prosecution for rape and do not require separation as a pre-
requisite for a charge of rape, however, are major progressive steps for
married women in Scotland's criminal law and surpass the limitations
of the laws of England. 53 By acknowledging that a rape can occur be-
tween spouses without a separation or divorce, the Duffy decision high-
lights the view that marriage does not preclude spousal rape.
influence of the CLRC which guided the English legislature against rape reform with
no strong and powerful women's lobby to push for changes in the law or rape).
148. D. HuME, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF SCOTLAND, RESPECTING CRIMES,
306 (4th ed. 1844). Hume states that "[The husband] cannot himself commit a rape on
his own wife . . . ." Id.
149. See Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act of 1976, CURRENT LAw STATUTES AN-
NOTATED, ch. 67, § 2 (giving no mention to rape crimes involving spouses).
150. H.M. Advocate v. Duffy, 1983 S.L.T. 7.
151. Id. at 8. Lord Robertson (judge) felt that in modern times it was illogical to
treat marital rape cases differently than assault in marriage cases, which subject the
husband to prosecution. Id. The judge continued to reason that Hume was writing one
hundred and fifty years ago when women held a substantially lower position in society,
thus, his opinion should not apply in contemporary times. Id. at 9. Finally, Lord Rob-
ertson concluded by stating that he did not think that "[I]t can be affirmed as a matter
of principle that the law of Scotland today is that a husband in no circumstances can
be guilty of the crime of rape upon his wife. It is a motion for which I am not prepared
to accede. . . ." Id.
152. See Temkin, Evidence in Sexual Assault Cases: The Scottish Proposal and
Alternatives, 47 MOD. L. REV. 625, 627 (1984) (claiming that the couple's living apart
probably dictated the result because the court felt the exemption was particularly
wrong in cases of separation).
153. Forte, Marital Rape: A Cautionary Note, 99 L.Q. REV. 513, 514 (1983).
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b. Uncertainty About the State of the Rape Law
Although the Duffy decision is encouraging, it is just one case and
uncertainty exists over whether the rest of the Scottish law will assume
the Duffy position. For example, the Scottish Law Commission, re-
sponding to demands of reform in the Scottish law, failed to address
marital rape in their report.154 Instead, the Commission focused solely
on the use of sexual history evidence and the concept of anonymity for
the victim. 15  Furthermore, in H.M. Advocate v. Paxton,'5 6 the High
Court of Justiciary centered only on the issue of the parties' separation.
The court held that Hume's stance against the possibility of marital
rape still was the law of Scotland (Duffy did not change this, according
to the court), but that an exception existed. 57 Specifically, when the
husband and wife are de facto separated and the wife withdraws her-
self from the society of her husband, which is an issue for the
factfinder, a husband may be guilty of raping his wife.' 8 However, in
S. v. H.M. Advocate' 59 the High Court of Justiciary boldly declared
that Hume's view of spousal immunity was no longer justified. °60 Lord
Emslie expressly stated that a wife's revocable consent during marriage
can be established as revoked dependant on all of the circumstances;
separation is no longer the only action that shows revoked consent to
intercourse.'61 This case appears as a bright light for married women,
but until the legislature makes changes, one can only hope that the rule
promulgated in Duffy and broadened even more in S. v. H.M. Advo-
cate, which allows prosecution of rape under normal marital conditions
of cohabitation, remains the influential point of law in Scotland.
154. SCOTTISH LAW COMMISSION, EVIDENCE: REPORT ON EVIDENCE IN CASES OF
RAPE AND OTHER SEXUAL OFFENSES, 1983, No. 78, construed in Temkin, supra note
152, at 625.
155. Id.
156. H.M. Advocate v. Paxton, 1984 J.C. 94, 1985 S.L.T. 96 (LEXIS, Scot li-
brary, Cases file).
157. Id. The court maintained that the Duffy court just found an exception for
Hume's statement of generality and that Hume's view still represented the law of Scot-
land. Id.
158. Id. The court concluded that the question before them was a narrow one, only
if Hume's declaration of law was applicable to the specific circumstances of the case
before them-that of a separated couple. Id.
159. S. v. H.M. Advocate, 1989 S.L.T. 469.
160. Id. at 473. The court claimed that if there was ever a reason to justify spousal
immunity, no such justification existed in present times. Id. According to the court, no
longer did a wife irrevocably consent to marital intercourse. Id.
161. Id. The court maintained that implied consent in marriage was a fiction and
therefore a woman's consent was revocable. Id. The court continued that even though
lack of a separation will make proving nonconsent more difficult, the question for the
court was still just a factual question-whether the woman withheld her consent. Id.
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3. Australia-Tasmania
The statutory law of Tasmania typifies the old, traditional rape law.
The Criminal Code of Tasmania"8 2 defines rape in common law form,
providing no protection to married women.' 69 It includes the common
law rule of spousal immunity, but does not contain the usual common
law exceptions to the rule.'"
The Tasmanian judiciary seems aware of the inadequacy of such a
dated rule. In Bellchambers v. The Queen,6 5 the judges commented on
the injustice of a rule that never gives a married woman a right to
refuse consent to intercourse with her husband. 6" Despite the remarks
of the judiciary in Bellchambers, Tasmania has not, however, followed
the lead of other Australian states in changing its rape law; it main-
tains the archaic spousal immunity in the face of open criticism.
4. South Africa
South Africa leans towards the nonremodeling mode of Tasmania.
The issue of marital rape has never come directly before a South Afri-
can court. 67 However, the chances that a wife could prosecute her hus-
band for rape, even if they were separated, are extremely slight; the
accepted legal position is that the marital rape exemption is part of the
law.' 68
Two legal developments began to change this archaic attitude. The
first development was the recent case of S. v. H.169 Even though the
South African judiciary was not compelled to make any statements, it
162. Criminal Code Act of 1924, TAs. STAT. (Austi.).
163. Id. The law defines rape. as nonconsensual carnal knowledge of a female who
is not the person's spouse without her consent. Id.
164. Id.
165. Bellchambers v. The Queen, construed in 7 CRIIm. L.J. 291 (1983).
166. Id. at 292. The judges saw the existing law as unacceptable on two levels. Id.
As with the common law rule, the law was outdated and prejudicial against women. Id.
Even worse, the law did not provide any circumstances in which a woman could revoke
her consent. Id.
167. See Kaganas, Rape in Marriage: Developments in South African Law, 35
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 456, 457 (1986) (commenting that judges and academics tended
to view inter-spousal rape as noncriminal). The author traces the exemption to English
and Roman-Dutch law. Id.
168. See Murray, Some Comments on Rape in Marriage and the English Criminal
Law Revision Committee's Report on Sexual Offenses, 102 S. AFR. L.J. 157, 158
(1985) (stating that the spousal exemption exists in South African law, police often
state a husband cannot rape his wife; yet, it has not been judicially decided).
169. S. v. H., South African Law Reports 750 (1985 (2)); see also Milton, Rape in
Marriage and Assault in Rape, 102 S. AFR. L.J. 367 (1985) (discussing the impact of
this case on the marital rape controversy).
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decided to comment on the marital rape rule.110 In responding to the
position that rape by a husband was a legal impossibility, Judge Niena-
ber of the South African judiciary held that authority supporting such
a view was scarce and that such a position affronted present-day moral-
ity.1 71 Judge Nienaber questioned the detrimental effects of the legal
concept of marital rape for women and added comments regarding the
relationship between marital assault and marital rape, the former pro-
viding no spousal immunity.172 Finally, the judge stressed that a wo-
man's interest in her bodily integrity must take precedence over the
marital privileges of her husband. 73
The second development was a report relating to women and sexual
offenses published by the South African Law Commission.1 74 The
Commission recommended total abolition of the spousal immunity
rule 7 5 The recommendation, however, attached one limiting qualifica-
tion; namely, the Attorney General must consent to the prosecution of
spousal rape before it is initiated.1y7 Although this qualification re-
stricts the reach of the law, the Commission's recommendations raise
the possibility of legislative reform that is far more effective than the
slow process of judicial changes. 77
5. Analytical Summary
England, Scotland, Tasmania, and South Africa have no statutory
170. See Kaganas, supra note 167, at 458 (commenting on Judge Nienaber's at-
tempt to disassociate South Africa from Hale's common law principle).
171. S. v. H., South African Law Reports at 752.
172. Id. at 755-56. The judge explained that the pivotal point of the marital ex-
emption rule was that the act of intercourse between husband and wife was not unlaw-
ful, and, therefore, gave the husband immunity from the assault taking place within the
actual act of intercourse. Id. He added that violence beyond this would constitute un-
lawful assault. Id. Judge Nienaber questioned the soundness of such a policy that ei-
ther deprived married women of the protections of the criminal law or interfered in the
marital bed. Id. at 753. Finally, the judge concluded that rape was defined as sexual
intercourse obtained without consent, and that force or violence played no role in the
crime. Id. Accordingly, Nienaber held that a husband is not immune from prosecution
for assault of his wife. Id. at 755.
173. Id. at 756; Kaganas, supra note 167, at 458.
174. WOMEN AND SEXUAL OFFENSES IN SOUTH AFRICA, Project 45, Apr. 1985,
construed in Kaganas, supra note 167, at 457.
175. Id.
176. See id. (asserting that this qualification is a mistake because it treats marital
rape cases differently from other rape cases).
177. See Kaganas & Murray, supra note 11, at 135 (maintaining that the judiciary
has conservative prosecutors who may be reluctant to bring such cases, thereby, leaving
a large number of women unprotected). In addition, statutory reform, unlike judicial
reforms, would base decisions on the existence of consortium, not the fiction of consent.
Id. at 135.
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changes in their rape laws despite the advances women have made in
the past decades. Since their legislatures seem unable to take any ac-
tion, the courts and various commissions are left to prompt reform. The
ability for law commissions to effectuate changes in the law is evident
by the emphasis placed on the English CLRC's recommendation of
spousal immunity, by the lack of comment on the matter by the Scot-
tish Law Commission and the various legal scholars in each country,
and by the lack of change in the statutory law after the reports were
published. Moreover, one of the most hopeful signs of change in South
Africa comes from the South African Law Commission's recommenda-
tion of abolition of spousal immunity for rape. The judiciary in the
above countries are left with the job of expanding the narrow statutory
law or common law. Although modern changes can be effectuated, the
judiciary, unless it is the highest court, does not promote any sort of
universal legal acceptance. What is revealed from these judiciary and
administrative actions is that when they begin to pave the way for mar-
ital rape law changes, it signifies the necessity of the legislature to con-
front the reality of married women as distinct individuals and pass a
resolution abolishing the marital rape exemption.
C. THE BACKWARDS APPROACH OF THE LEGISLATURE FOR
MARITAL RAPE
1. Australia-South Australia
a. Statutory Rape Law
South Australia takes an opposite and rather backwards approach to
marital rape compared with the processes of the other aforementioned
countries. In 1976, the original South Australian bill drafted on marital
rape, which provided no spousal immunity,178 was deemed inadequate.
Legislators later limited the provision because of concern about the
strain it placed on a marriage.Y" In addition, worries abounded about
vindictive wives misusing such a rule to the detriment of the hus-
band. °0 Thus, the legislature added an amendment to the bill, limiting
178. See Scutt, Consent in Rape: The Problem of the Marriage Contract 3
MONASH U.L. REv. 255, 277-78 (1977) (citing S.12(5) Bill No. 55, South Australia
Parliament (1976)) (providing no presumed consent to either sexual intercourse or to
indecent assault merely because the parties are spouses).
179. See id. at 277 (discussing how the legislatures had no concern about the wife's
feelings of a rule disallowing her husband to use her for his sexual purposes at his
demand).
180. See id. at 277 (commenting that the Criminal Law and Penal Methods Re-
form Committee of South Australia was even set up to judge the propriety of a law
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the circumstances of prosecution for marital rape with special qualifica-
tions governing the definition of spousal rape; this was the form of the
Criminal Law Consolidation Amendment Act of 1976 (Act).181
b. Criticism of Limited Spousal Immunity
In addition to the questionable reasoning behind the Act,18 2 a num-
ber of problems exist with the law. One provision that limits immunity
requires that the alleged offense consist of or be associated with an
assault threatening or causing actual bodily harm.183 Pursuant to the
Act, if a woman unwillingly submits to her husband's sexual demands
before he harms her or threatens harm, she may have no cause of ac-
tion.1 84 This necessitates the wife to physically defend herself during
intercourse in order to successfully prosecute for rape, which improp-
erly encourages self-help in criminal matters.18 5
Other aspects of the Act also present problems. Having to show ac-
tual or threatened bodily harm 86 ignores the true concept of rape as
nonconsensual sex.1 87 Moreover, nonconsent is inclusive of the act of
that put such a dangerous weapon into wives' hands).
181. Criminal Law Consolidation Amendment Act of 1976, § 73(5), S. Austl.
Acts. The amendment states that:
[A] person shall not be convicted of rape or indecent assault upon his spouse, or
an attempt to commit, or assault with intent to commit, rape or indecent assault
upon his spouse . . .unless the alleged offence consisted of, was preceded or
accompanied by, or was associated with-
(a) assault occasioning actual bodily harm, or
threat of such an assault, upon the spouse;
(b) an act of gross indecency, or threat of such
an act, against the spouse;
(c) an act calculated seriously and substantially
to humiliate the spouse; or
(d) threat of the commission of a criminal act
against any person.
Id.
182. Id.
183. Criminal Law Consolidation Amendment Act of 1976, § 73(5)(a), S. Austl.
Acts.
184. See Scutt, supra note 178, at 283 (discussing the law's "active harm"
requirement).
185. See id. (commenting that such a requirement is at odds with the usual crimi-
nal law view that does not condone self-help; it also opens the wife up to prosecution if
she injures her husband in the process).
186. Criminal Law Consolidation Amendment Act of 1976, § 73(5)(a), S. Austl.
Acts.
187. See Scutt, supra note 178, at 282 (stating that rape is carnal knowledge with-
out consent and maligning that definition by adding a requirement of physical threat or
actual injury).
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rape and the threat to do the act.188 A further problem is the lack of
definition in the Act. Even though no bodily contact has occurred, a
sexual offense may constitute gross indecency.189 The legislature, how-
ever, failed to define the acts that constitute gross indecency in the law.
Thus, prospective defendants have no idea of what would bring them
within the ambit of the criminal law.190 Finally, the new qualifications
added into the Act as amended 91 are so confusing and non-definable
(e.g., what is gross indecency exactly?) that they may render the law
meaningless.192
The critics suggest that the legislature should have either left the law
alone,1 93 or have treated married and single women and married and
single men equally with regard to presumptions of consent when it
comes to rape.194 Such concepts comply with the modern view of a wo-
man holding rights when she marries and not relegating them as un-
necessary if such rights interfere with a superficially harmonious mar-
riage. South Australia may face the same problem Victoria previously
met with when they first changed their rape law. Specifically, confusion
over terms and failure to move toward a concept of true equality could
lead South Australia in the direction of more reforms.
IV. RECOMMENDATION-ABOLISH THE MARITAL RAPE
EXEMPTION
The examination of marital rape laws and the various critiques of
each type of law lead to one determination; namely, all countries and
states must statutorily abolish marital rape exemptions and criminalize
marital rape. The rationales used to justify the spousal exemption are
not persuasive. Abolishing the immunity would not increase the
188. Criminal Law Consolidation Amendment Act of 1976, § 73(5)(d), S. Austi.
Acts; see Scutt, supra note 178, at 281 (noting the unlikelihood a person would know-
ingly achieve nonconsensual intercourse without first threatening to carry out such an
act).
189. See id. (finding that exposing an erect penis to a non-consenting spouse may
qualify as grossly indecent behavior under the Amended Act, and noting the unreason-
ableness of applying conflicting standards to married and unmarried parties).
190. See id. at 280 (stating that failure to outline what constitutes gross indecency
gives prospective defendants no notice of what is illegal).
191. Criminal Law Consolidation Amendment Act of 1976, § 73(5), S. Austi.
Acts; see note 181 (listing the four qualifications for spousal rape).
192. See Scutt, supra note 178, at 279 (using the humiliation qualification as an
example and stating that nonconsensual intercourse would fulfill the qualification).
193. See id. at 283 (complaining that the Act adds confusion and that the common
law could have dealt with the issue because the common law defines rape as being
nonconsensual, which could easily include marital rape).
194. See id. at 283-84 (suggesting that South Australia follow such a course).
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probability of marital collapse; the marriage has already deteriorated if
rape occurs l 5 The increased risk of fabricated accusations and black-
mail between spouses is not a true or justified reason for retaining the
marital immunity.1 96 It is wrongly assumed that if countries abolish the
exemption, the floodgates of litigation will open and vindictive, lying
wives will invade the courts with false complaints; proof to the opposite
conclusion is documented.9 This assumption is, in fact, just an exten-
sion of the stereotype of a vindictive wife. 198 Furthermore, although dif-
ficulty in acquiring evidence in marital rape cases may be an obstacle,
many illegalities are difficult to prove, and, yet, are not abolished as
crimes. 99 In addition, even if women tend to change their minds about
195. See Backhouse & Schoenroth, supra note 18, at 178 (contending that legal
action can do no more damage to marriage than rape and that preserving violent rela-
tionships are not acceptable goals); Note, The Marital Rape Exemption, supra note
34, at 315-16 (stating that the marital reconciliation rationale in support of the marital
rape exemption does not recognize that the wife usually files rape charges when the
spouses are separated after a long history of marital discord); see also Note, To Have
and To Hold, supra note 19, at 1268-69 (noting that the violent act of rape, not a legal
proceeding, disrupts the marriage, and adding that the reconciliation in the marriage is
often part of the cycle of psychological dependence on a violent husband).
196. See Note, The Marital Rape Exemption, supra note 34, at 314-15 (stating
that the whole ordeal of rape prosecutions are often more shameful and fearful for the
victim, rendering it highly unlikely that a vengeful woman would choose to personally
degrade herself); Freeman, supra note 16, at 19 (arguing that if marital rape is
plagued by evidentiary problems, a vindictive wife would hardly use such difficult
means); see also Backhouse & Schoenroth, supra note 18, at 178 (raising the proposi-
tion that the safeguards of the criminal justice system, including proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt and the use of juries, are sufficient to determine the validity of rape
charges).
197. See NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE ON MARITAL RAPE, WOMEN'S HISTORY RE-
SEARCH CENTER, PROSECUTION STATISTICS RE: HUSBANDS WHO HAVE RAPED THEIR
WIVES SINCE FALL 1978 AFTER OREGON RIDEOUT TRIAL (1985) (citing the percent-
age of convictions of completed cases as 89% for separated couples, 86% for couples
that were together, and 88% as an average for both); D. RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 205(finding that wives who report the rape to the police are usually the most traumatized
by the experience, therefore the fear of unfounded reports is not appropriate).
198. See D. FINKELHOR & K. YLLO, supra note 1, at 175 (stating that the corrob-
oration requirement present in some rape statutes also upholds the view that women lie
in sexual crimes).
199. See Backhouse & Schoenroth, supra note 18, at 179-80 (claiming that eviden-
tiary problems do not justify the immunity when women are unable to meet the steep
burden of proof and when this deprives them of justice); Freeman, supra note 16, at
18-19 (stating that it strains credulity to prosecute rape cases that only involve stranger
rapists); Note, The Marital Rape Exemption, supra note 34, at 314 (stating that the
same evidentiary problems concerning consent are inolved in all rape cases, particu-
larly when the parties have had previous sexual relations); Note, To Have and To
Hold, supra note 19, at 1269 (presenting two arguments which explain the use of the
evidentiary difficulty rationale). The view which focuses on the problems in acquiring
evidence bases itself on a deep discriminatory idea of women as liars. Id. In addition,
the view ignores the reality of the stigma of bringing rape complaints; this stigma leads
women to conceal the incident rather than to bring forward a complaint. Id.
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testifying against their husbands, this is no justification to retain the
immunity.200 Finally, other laws such as family laws and assault and
battery laws are not adequate for dealing with marital rape as a dis-
tinct crime of humiliation and violence.201
Providing compromises, such as the common law exceptions to the
spousal immunity laws maintained in England, the criminal law act in
South Australia, and the majority of the state statutes in the United
States are not solutions to marital rape. Instead, the laws punish a hus-
band for rape only when no marriage really exists, as in legal separa-
tion. This perpetuates the theory that under ordinary circumstances
rape in marriage is by definition impossible.
Retaining statutory spousal immunity, as exemplified by Tasmania,
South Africa, Scotland, England, and three states in the United States,
defies logic by stating that married women must always consent to
marital sex. Moreover, the legislatures' inaction tells married women
that they do not deserve protection because the common law view of
women as their husband's chattel still prevails. Additional problems are
created when judges attempt to construct common law solutions to the
problem, as in England, Scotland, Tasmania, and South Africa,
thereby, adding more questions as to the state of the rape law. Com-
mon law solutions to statutory problems place the role of women in the
criminal justice system in a quandary. A woman can not derive the full
benefit from a law when she is unsure what the law is. Statutory aboli-
tion of the spousal exemption for rape is the only solution that sends a
clear message to the married woman and contains an unqualified right
to refuse sex in the context of marriage.
Each common law country or state examined above originally rested
its rationale for the exemption on outdated theories of marriage and
women. Nevertheless, Canada, New Zealand, a select number of states
200. See Freeman, supra note 16, at 20 (suggesting that courts could use the
spousal immunity rationale for marital assault cases, but noting that no debate has ever
centered on establishing spousal immunity in assault cases); see also Temkin, supra
note 44, at 409-10 (noting that although a time lag often exists between the commis-
sion and the reporting of any rape case, the police are attuned to this, and prosecutors
therefore do not dismiss these other cases).
201. See Backhouse & Schoenroth, supra note 18, at 179 (contending that rape is
a greater invasion than other types of physical assault, therefore, assault and battery
laws are not appropriate protection); Freeman, supra note 16, at 20-21 (asserting that
divorce proceedings as an alternative remedy are not an answer for poor women who
are financially dependent on their husbands, and arguing that family law does not nec-
essarily give women protection); see also Note, The Marital Rape Exemption, supra
note 34, at 316 (commenting that discussing alternative remedies assumes the validity
of the exemption and fails to realize that rape laws protect women from the
severe emotional and psychological consequences of the act of rape).
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in the United States, and the Australian states of Victoria and New
South Wales statutorily eliminated the spousal exemption due to the
realization that marital rape exemptions symbolize the degradation of
the married woman and subjugation of her rights in a modern society.
These countries have succeeded in harmonizing the law with modern
societal attitudes. They stand as examples for other common law
countries.
CONCLUSION
A law that does not give married and unmarried women equal pro-
tection creates conditions that lead to marital rape.202 It allows men
and women to believe that wife rape is acceptable.0 3 Making wife rape
illegal will remove the destructive attitudes that promote marital
rape.20 4 Such an action raises a moral boundary that informs society
that a punishment results if the boundary is transgressed. 05 Husbands
may then begin to recognize that marital rape is wrong. Recognition
coupled with criminal punishment should deter husbands from raping
2061their wives. Women should not have to tolerate rape and violence in
202. See D. RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 360 (stating that men will not change unless
they have to change, and asserting that treating rape in marriage as a husband's privi-
lege is an insult and a danger to all women).
203. See id. at 357 (commenting that the legality of marital rape not only perpetu-
ates the toleration of it but also causes the toleration because the legality makes people
treat marital rape as acceptable conduct).
Examples of this acceptance often come from women themselves. Diana Russell's
survey offers the following examples:
Mrs. Keating: He'd want it, I'd be tired. This is a big complaint of wives...
I'm a nice wife. I don't want, he want, okay, I lay there just like a sick person
• . . He wants it, I do it.
Mrs. Randle: Many times I didn't feel like having sex but I did it. With a hus-
band, you feel forced. I have an obligation to my husband which is very bad. It's
always been a man's world.
Mrs. Matthews: [I] wasn't physically interested in him, and I only had sex with
him because it was a wifely duty.
Mrs. Ingalls: He didn't use physical force, but there was this feeling that 'you
might as well give in because he has the right to it.'
Mrs. Victor: When I'm sleeping I don't want to be bothered. He didn't force me
but if I didn't want it, he'd do it anyhow.
Id. at 81-83.
204. See id. at 357 (commenting that society must make wife rape illegal and that
it must destroy the stereotypes and myths that accompany marital rape so that society
may understand marital rape as a serious crime).
205. See D. FINKELHOR & K. YLLO, supra note 1, at 198 (commenting that
changing the marital rape law will raise the public's awareness of the value of equal
protection to married women and, therefore, possibly deter this behavior).
206. See id. (stating that after public debate and the enactment of a law providing
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marriage. Total statutory abolition of the marital rape exemption is the
first necessary step in teaching societies that dehumanized treatment of
women will not be tolerated and that marital rape is not a husband's
privilege,207 but rather a violent act and an injustice that must be
criminalized.
for punishment of offenders, men will not think they have a right to force sex upon
their wives and women will be justified in complaining about nonconsensual
intercourse).
207. See D. RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 358 (concluding that charging a husband
with rape is a symbol of a woman's right to decide if, when, how, and with whom she
will have sexual relations).
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